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Cantor Fitzgerald (Brandon Lutnick)

#17 of 117
55/100Mixed recordhigh confidence

55/100 from 17 resolved vehicles (13 closed, 4 failed), 77% of the raw 57 after small-sample shrink, completion credit gated ×0.80 by the measured post-close record. Confidence: high.

Vehicles
21
13 in the live DB · 8 SEC-verified priors · computed by SpacBrain from cited rows, as of 2026-09-10
Resolved
17
13 closed · 3 liquidated · 1 terminated
Best priced exit
+38.6%
GCMG vs the $10.00 baseline
Worst priced exit
-99.6%
LIDR vs the $10.00 baseline

Sponsor DNA

what has happened before, with its sample size
  • Completion rate76%n=17 resolved vehiclesderived

    Of the 17 vehicles this sponsor has taken to a final outcome, 13 closed a business combination.

  • Liquidation rate18%n=17 resolved vehiclesderived

    3 of those 17 returned the trust to holders and wound up without a deal.

  • Median post-close return-69.6%n=6 priced completed deSPACsderived

    A holder who stayed through one of this sponsor's completed deals has ended up a median -69.6% against the $10.00 trust baseline they could have taken in cash, across the 6 vehicles we can price. Measured at the last close we hold, not at a fixed anniversary.

  • Median redemption29%n=3 redemption events with a stated ratederived

    When holders of this sponsor's vehicles have been offered the exit, the median event saw 29% of public shares redeemed, across 3 events that state a rate.

  • Deals terminated2terminated dealscounted

    2 announced combinations have been terminated on this sponsor's record — 1 on a live vehicle, 1 on a vehicle that then wound up.

  • Extension votes on record0extension votescounted

    No extension vote extracted for this sponsor. Extraction is partial across the universe, so this is an absence of rows, NOT evidence of zero extensions.

6 of 6 statistics carry a figure for this sponsor. A rate is published from 3 resolved vehicles and a median from 3 observations: two points have no middle, and a rate over two can only be 0, 50 or 100. Counts have no threshold — a count is an observation, not an estimate.

Everything marked derived is arithmetic we did to rows we hold, not a figure any filing states.

What this panel will not tell you, and why (6)
  • Median day-one move on announcement

    PriceBar holds 2026-05-11 → 2026-08-17 only. Of 83 dated announcements across the whole universe, 16 fall on a day we hold a bar for a scored sponsor’s vehicle, spread over 14 sponsors — one sponsor reaches three observations. A bar that does not exist is not a 0% move.

  • Pre-vote move

    Only 12 deals carry a vote date at all, and exactly 1 of them falls inside the PriceBar window. One observation is an anecdote with a decimal point.

  • Median time from IPO to announcement

    42 IPO→announcement pairs exist, but only six sponsors have two and one has three. Enough for a statistic about the asset class; not for one about a sponsor, which is what this panel claims to be.

  • Median time from signing to close

    Exactly 1 deal in the entire database is CLOSED and carries an announcement date. There is no 2nd observation anywhere to take a median over.

  • 12-month post-deSPAC return

    `SponsorPriorVehicle.postCloseReturnPct` is measured at the LAST close we hold, whenever that is — not on a 12-month anniversary. We hold no price history for the resulting companies, so the anniversary price does not exist. The median post-close return above is the honest version of this number and says what it is measured against.

  • Sponsor capital at risk

    Nothing stores it. The only sponsor-economics column we hold is `Deal.promotePct` (founder shares as a percentage of post-IPO shares, on 34 deals under a scored sponsor), and that measures the equity the sponsor got nearly free — the opposite of the dollars it put in. Deriving at-risk capital from a promote percentage would be an invention with a citation stapled to it.

Score breakdown

every component, what it measured, and what it could not
  • Deal completion20% weightn=1761/100

    13/17 resolved vehicles closed a deal (76%); 3 liquidated, 1 terminated. Gated ×0.80 by measured post-close quality (30/100): closing deals that ended below trust value is not a completed job, so only 80% of the completion credit is earned. Full credit resumes at outcome quality 50/100 (the median deSPAC ending at trust value); the gate can never exceed 1×.

  • Liquidation / termination drag16% weightn=2180/100

    3 liquidations and 1 termination across 21 vehicles raised → 20% attrition (terminations 1.25×, stale shells 0.75×).

  • Post-close outcome quality40% weightn=630/100

    5 priced deSPACs vs trust value (prior vehicles against the $10.00 IPO baseline, in-DB vehicles against the trust they filed): median -42%, 3/5 still worth at least half of trust, 2 at under a tenth of it. Worst: LIDR -100%. Best: GCMG +39%. 1 more delisted with no surviving quote — scored as a total loss (a known outcome, not a gap), with no % invented. 7 other completion(s) not priced (7 no stored price) — left OUT of the ratio, not guessed.

  • Redemption behaviour10% weightn=363/100

    Median 29% of public shares redeemed across 3 filed events (lower is better).

  • Extension reliance8% weight100/100

    0 extension votes across 13 in-DB vehicles (0.0 per vehicle; 3+ scores zero).

  • Live fleet vs trust6% weightn=4100/100

    4/4 live vehicles trading at or above the trust value they filed.

  • Measured weak recordflat penaltyn=6100/100

    Median post-close return -70% across 6 measured prior vehicles — above the -80% weak-record threshold.

How the number is built: weighted mean of the six components above = 57, then pulled 23% of the way back to the neutral 50 for small sample size (17 resolved vehicles) = 55.

How the Sponsor Score worksoutcome-first weighting

The score answers one question: did this sponsor make money for the people who held through the merger? Not “did they get a deal signed”. Those are different questions, and most sponsor rankings quietly answer the second one.

So post-close outcome quality carries 40% — the realised return of every prior vehicle we can price from a primary filing, measured against the $10.00 trust baseline. Deal completion carries 20%, and it is gated: closing deals that ended below trust value only earns part of the completion credit, because closing is a precondition for a return, not a return. Liquidation and termination drag takes 16%, redemption behaviour 10%, extension reliance 8%, and what the tape says about the live fleet just 6% — a quote is an opinion, not evidence.

A component with no data is never guessed. It is held at the neutral 50 across its full weight and labelled “not measurable”. Dropping it and re-weighting the rest would quietly reward a sponsor for having no verifiable record — exactly backwards. The consequence: a sponsor with no post-close evidence at all cannot read above 71, and cannot be labelled a strong operator no matter how many deals it closed.

Experience never inflates the score. There is no “years in business” component. A first-time sponsor sits at exactly 50 and reads “unproven” with low confidence — new is not bad. Sample size only pulls a score toward or away from that neutral 50, so nobody is called great or terrible on one vehicle.

Every input is a row already in the database, sourced from SEC primary filings: prior vehicles verified on EDGAR, redemption results read out of 8-Ks, prices from public feeds. The arithmetic is deterministic — no model, no LLM, no judgement call. Research tooling, not investment advice.

Prior vehicles

8 SEC-verified — what happened to holders who stayed in
VehicleOutcomeBecamevs $10.00TodaySource
CF Finance Acquisition Corp IIPO 2018CompletedGCM GrosvenorGCMG+38.6%Trading$13.86 · Aug 14, 20260001213900-20-031326 opens on sec.gov in a new tab
CF Finance Acquisition Corp IIIPO 2020CompletedView Inclisting endedDelisted0001193125-24-146158 opens on sec.gov in a new tab
CF Finance Acquisition Corp IIIIPO 2020CompletedAEyeLIDR-99.6%Trading$1.31 · Aug 14, 20260001213900-26-086143 opens on sec.gov in a new tab
CF Acquisition Corp VIPO 2021CompletedSatellogicSATL-42.0%Trading$5.80 · Aug 14, 20260001193125-21-328178 opens on sec.gov in a new tab
CF Acquisition Corp VIIPO 2021CompletedRumble / RUM GroupRUM-25.4%Trading$7.46 · Aug 14, 20260001213900-26-087234 opens on sec.gov in a new tab
CF Acquisition Corp VIIIIPO 2021CompletedXBP GlobalXBP-97.2%Trading$2.81 · Aug 14, 20260001213900-23-063736 opens on sec.gov in a new tab
CF Acquisition Corp IVIPO 2020Liquidated0001213900-23-096495 opens on sec.gov in a new tab
CF Acquisition Corp VIIIPO 2021Liquidated0001213900-25-054909 opens on sec.gov in a new tab

5 of 8 prior vehicles carry an honest post-close price, split-adjusted against the $10.00 trust baseline a holder gave up at the merger. Cash buyouts are read from the per-share consideration stated in the DEFM14A / SC 14D-9; a buyout no filing prices stays unpriced and stays out of the score. “Listing ended” means the quote stopped with no buyer — scored as a total loss because that is what the evidence says, but never printed as a percentage we cannot source.

Research profile

synthesized from SEC filings + sourced research

Cantor Fitzgerald — SPAC franchise now led by Brandon Lutnick. Prior-vehicle track record (SEC-verified): (1) CF Finance Acquisition Corp I COMPLETED → GCM Grosvenor (GCMG, 2020; confirmed via joint 425). (2) CF Finance II COMPLETED → View Inc (2021; bankrupt, 25-NSE 2024-04). (3) CF Finance III COMPLETED → AEye (LIDR, Nasdaq). (4) CF Acquisition V COMPLETED → Satellogic (SATL, 2022; confirmed via joint 425). (5) CF Acquisition VI COMPLETED → Rumble, now RUM Group (RUM, Nasdaq). (6) CF Acquisition VIII COMPLETED → XBP Europe, now XBP Global (XBP, Nasdaq). LIQUIDATED (25-NSE + 15-12G): CF Acquisition IV (2023), CF Acquisition VII (2025). Net: 6 completed deSPACs, 2 liquidations (plus the current Cantor Equity Partners fleet). Mixed post-close (Rumble/AEye/XBP/GCM listed; View bankrupt, Satellogic weak). Sources: SEC EDGAR submissions API (formerNames) + full-text search, efts.sec.gov.

— research profile — Cantor Fitzgerald's SPAC franchise is led by Brandon G. Lutnick, the 27-year-old Chairman and CEO of Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., who assumed the role after his father, Howard Lutnick, was confirmed as the 41st U.S. Secretary of Commerce in 2025 and divested his ownership in the firm. Brandon Lutnick, a Stanford graduate who joined Cantor in 2022 in equity sales and trading after beginning his career as a credit analyst at Oak Hill Advisors, serves as Chairman and CEO across the firm's extensive series of blank-check vehicles. He is supported by CFO Jane Novak, the Global Head of Accounting Policy at Cantor, who has served as CFO or former CFO of several Cantor SPACs. His brother Kyle Lutnick serves as Executive Vice Chairman of the holding company. The family ownership transition was structured through trusts for the benefit of Brandon, Kyle, and other adult children, with Brandon as controlling trustee, and minority investments from 26North (founded by Josh Harris) and Glenn August of Oak Hill Advisors. Cantor Fitzgerald acts as sole bookrunner on all its SPAC IPOs, and the firm has formed at least sixteen blank-check companies to date, with vehicles including the Cantor Equity Partners series (CEPO through CAES) and earlier CF Acquisition vehicles.

The sponsor's track record reveals a mixed to poor set of de-SPAC outcomes. Among completed mergers, CF Acquisition VIII merged with process automation firm XBP Europe (XBP), which traded 77% below the $10 offer price, and CF Acquisition VI merged with video platform Rumble (RUM) in 2022, down 26% from offer. Cantor Equity Partners merged with bitcoin investment vehicle Twenty One Capital (XXI); the stock initially surged 400% on the announcement but subsequently traded 32% to 40% below the $10 offer price. Cantor Equity Partners III merged with hookah products maker AIR Global (AIIR), which was down 32% from $10. More recently announced but not yet completed deals include Cantor Equity Partners I (CEPO) merging with Bitcoin Standard Treasury Company (BSTR), a bitcoin treasury vehicle involving Blockstream CEO Adam Back contributing up to 30,000 Bitcoin (approximately $3.5 billion) in a deal that could reach $4 billion with up to $800 million in outside capital, and Cantor Equity Partners II (CEPT) merging with asset tokenization platform Securitize. CEPO traded modestly above $10 at +6% and CEPT at +20% following their deal announcements. The firm has aggressively pivoted toward crypto-focused SPACs, with Brandon Lutnick championing what he describes as combining two volatile but compelling asset classes—crypto and SPACs—and the combined bitcoin purchases across BSTR Holdings and Twenty One Capital could approach $10 billion.

The most significant red flag surrounding the Cantor SPAC operation is the potential for conflicts of interest arising from…

Data provenance & audit trail1 internal entry

Written by SpacBrain’s data agents whenever a figure is captured, corrected or flagged, and kept verbatim so every number on this page can be traced back to the filing that states it. This is a running log, not the current record: an early entry may be superseded by a later correction — the panels above always hold the current values.

Cantor Fitzgerald (Brandon Lutnick) — sponsor record
NOTE-SEAL2026-08-15

Raw SEC identifiers lifted out of the public prose above (the sentences are unchanged); verbatim, each shown with the words it followed: "…verified): (1) CF Finance Acquisition Corp I (CIK 0001728041)" · "… confirmed via joint 425). (2) CF Finance II (CIK 0001811856)" · "…ankrupt, 25-NSE 2024-04). (3) CF Finance III (CIK 0001818644)" · "… → AEye (LIDR, Nasdaq). (4) CF Acquisition V (CIK 0001828049)" · "…firmed via joint 425). (5) CF Acquisition VI (CIK 0001830081)" · "…Group (RUM, Nasdaq). (6) CF Acquisition VIII (CIK 0001839530)" · "…DATED (25-NSE + 15-12G): CF Acquisition IV (CIK 0001825249" · "…(CIK 0001825249, 2023), CF Acquisition VII (CIK 0001839519"

The Sponsor Score is a deterministic research heuristic over primary-sourced rows — never a recommendation, and never a prediction. It cannot tell you whether this sponsor’s next deal will work; it tells you, precisely and with its own uncertainty attached, what the last ones did.