Eagle Equity Partners (Sloan/Sagansky)

#6 of 117

58/100Weak recordhigh confidence

58/100 from 9 resolved vehicles (9 closed, 0 failed), 64% of the raw 63 after small-sample shrink, completion credit gated ×0.86 by the measured post-close record. Confidence: high. Tier capped at 'weak': measured weak record: median post-close return -86% across 9 measured prior vehicles (rule: ≤ -80% over ≥2).

Label capped at “Weak record” — measured weak record: median post-close return -86% across 9 measured prior vehicles (rule: ≤ -80% over ≥2). The number itself is untouched: caps only stop the word being wrong, they never move points.

Vehicles

2 in the live DB · 9 SEC-verified priors · computed by SpacBrain from cited rows, as of 2026-09-10

Resolved

9 closed · 0 liquidated · 0 terminated

Best priced exit

+137.6%

WSC vs the $10.00 baseline

Worst priced exit

-85.7%

SHCR vs the $10.00 baseline

Sponsor DNA

what has happened before, with its sample size

Completion rate100%n=9 resolved vehiclesderived
Of the 9 vehicles this sponsor has taken to a final outcome, 9 closed a business combination.
Liquidation rate0%n=9 resolved vehiclesderived
0 of those 9 returned the trust to holders and wound up without a deal.
Median post-close return-85.7%n=9 priced completed deSPACsderived
A holder who stayed through one of this sponsor's completed deals has ended up a median -85.7% against the $10.00 trust baseline they could have taken in cash, across the 9 vehicles we can price. Measured at the last close we hold, not at a fixed anniversary.
Median redemption—n=0 redemption events with a stated ratederived
No redemption event with a stated rate on record — absent, which is not the same as zero. Extraction covers part of the universe, so a low count is our coverage as much as the sponsor’s history.
Deals terminated0terminated dealscounted
No announced combination on this sponsor’s record has been terminated.
Extension votes on record0extension votescounted
No extension vote extracted for this sponsor. Extraction is partial across the universe, so this is an absence of rows, NOT evidence of zero extensions.

5 of 6 statistics carry a figure for this sponsor. A rate is published from 3 resolved vehicles and a median from 3 observations: two points have no middle, and a rate over two can only be 0, 50 or 100. Counts have no threshold — a count is an observation, not an estimate.

Everything marked derived is arithmetic we did to rows we hold, not a figure any filing states.

What this panel will not tell you, and why (6)›

Median day-one move on announcement
PriceBar holds 2026-05-11 → 2026-08-17 only. Of 83 dated announcements across the whole universe, 16 fall on a day we hold a bar for a scored sponsor’s vehicle, spread over 14 sponsors — one sponsor reaches three observations. A bar that does not exist is not a 0% move.
Pre-vote move
Only 12 deals carry a vote date at all, and exactly 1 of them falls inside the PriceBar window. One observation is an anecdote with a decimal point.
Median time from IPO to announcement
42 IPO→announcement pairs exist, but only six sponsors have two and one has three. Enough for a statistic about the asset class; not for one about a sponsor, which is what this panel claims to be.
Median time from signing to close
Exactly 1 deal in the entire database is CLOSED and carries an announcement date. There is no 2nd observation anywhere to take a median over.
12-month post-deSPAC return
`SponsorPriorVehicle.postCloseReturnPct` is measured at the LAST close we hold, whenever that is — not on a 12-month anniversary. We hold no price history for the resulting companies, so the anniversary price does not exist. The median post-close return above is the honest version of this number and says what it is measured against.
Sponsor capital at risk
Nothing stores it. The only sponsor-economics column we hold is `Deal.promotePct` (founder shares as a percentage of post-IPO shares, on 34 deals under a scored sponsor), and that measures the equity the sponsor got nearly free — the opposite of the dollars it put in. Deriving at-risk capital from a promote percentage would be an invention with a citation stapled to it.

Score breakdown

every component, what it measured, and what it could not

Deal completion20% weightn=986/100
9/9 resolved vehicles closed a deal (100%); 0 liquidated, 0 terminated. Gated ×0.86 by measured post-close quality (36/100): closing deals that ended below trust value is not a completed job, so only 86% of the completion credit is earned. Full credit resumes at outcome quality 50/100 (the median deSPAC ending at trust value); the gate can never exceed 1×.
Liquidation / termination drag16% weightn=11100/100
0 liquidations and 0 terminations across 11 vehicles raised → 0% attrition (terminations 1.25×, stale shells 0.75×).
Post-close outcome quality40% weightn=936/100
5 priced deSPACs vs trust value (prior vehicles against the $10.00 IPO baseline, in-DB vehicles against the trust they filed): median +19%, 4/5 still worth at least half of trust, 0 at under a tenth of it. Worst: SHCR -86%. Best: WSC +138%. 4 more delisted with no surviving quote — scored as a total loss (a known outcome, not a gap), with no % invented.
Redemption behaviour10% weightnot measurable
No redemption events extracted for this sponsor yet (coverage is partial) — held neutral; absence of rows is NOT evidence of zero redemptions.
Held at the neutral 50 across its full 10% weight — missing data is never scored as a failure, but it never earns credit either.
Extension reliance8% weightnot measurable
No extension filings extracted for this sponsor — held neutral (partial coverage, not a clean record).
Held at the neutral 50 across its full 8% weight — missing data is never scored as a failure, but it never earns credit either.
Live fleet vs trust6% weightn=2100/100
2/2 live vehicles trading at or above the trust value they filed.
Measured weak recordflat penaltyn=90/100
Median post-close return -86% across 9 measured prior vehicles (threshold -80% over ≥2) → tier capped at 'weak'. No point deduction: these outcomes are already charged through outcome quality and the completion gate.

How the number is built: weighted mean of the six components above = 63, then pulled 36% of the way back to the neutral 50 for small sample size (9 resolved vehicles) = 58.

2 components are not measurable for this sponsor (redemption behaviour, extension reliance) — 18% of the weight is a neutral placeholder rather than evidence. That is why the confidence chip reads high.

How the Sponsor Score worksoutcome-first weighting

The score answers one question: did this sponsor make money for the people who held through the merger? Not “did they get a deal signed”. Those are different questions, and most sponsor rankings quietly answer the second one.

So post-close outcome quality carries 40% — the realised return of every prior vehicle we can price from a primary filing, measured against the $10.00 trust baseline. Deal completion carries 20%, and it is gated: closing deals that ended below trust value only earns part of the completion credit, because closing is a precondition for a return, not a return. Liquidation and termination drag takes 16%, redemption behaviour 10%, extension reliance 8%, and what the tape says about the live fleet just 6% — a quote is an opinion, not evidence.

A component with no data is never guessed. It is held at the neutral 50 across its full weight and labelled “not measurable”. Dropping it and re-weighting the rest would quietly reward a sponsor for having no verifiable record — exactly backwards. The consequence: a sponsor with no post-close evidence at all cannot read above 71, and cannot be labelled a strong operator no matter how many deals it closed.

Experience never inflates the score. There is no “years in business” component. A first-time sponsor sits at exactly 50 and reads “unproven” with low confidence — new is not bad. Sample size only pulls a score toward or away from that neutral 50, so nobody is called great or terrible on one vehicle.

Every input is a row already in the database, sourced from SEC primary filings: prior vehicles verified on EDGAR, redemption results read out of 8-Ks, prices from public feeds. The arithmetic is deterministic — no model, no LLM, no judgement call. Research tooling, not investment advice.

Prior vehicles

9 SEC-verified — what happened to holders who stayed in

Vehicle	Outcome	Became	vs $10.00	Today	Source
Global Eagle Acquisition Corp.IPO 2011	Completed	Global Eagle Entertainment Inc.	listing ended	Delisted	0001144204-13-006534
Silver Eagle Acquisition Corp.IPO 2013	Completed	Videocon d2h LimitedVDTH	-15.1%	Delisted$8.49 · Apr 20, 2018	0001144204-15-020486
Double Eagle Acquisition Corp.IPO 2015	Completed	WillScot CorpWSC	+137.6%	Trading$23.76 · Aug 14, 2026	0001104659-17-071936
Platinum Eagle Acquisition Corp.IPO 2018	Completed	Target Hospitality Corp.TH	+74.4%	Trading$17.44 · Aug 14, 2026	0001104659-19-016591
Diamond Eagle Acquisition Corp.IPO 2019	Completed	DraftKings Inc.DKNG	listing ended	Delisted	0001104659-20-052633
Falcon Capital Acquisition Corp.IPO 2020	Completed	Sharecare, Inc.SHCR	-85.7%	Acquired$1.43 · Oct 22, 2024	0001213900-21-036180
Flying Eagle Acquisition Corp.IPO 2020	Completed	Firy Inc. (formerly Skillz Inc.)FIRY	listing ended	Delisted	0001104659-20-138151
Soaring Eagle Acquisition Corp.IPO 2021	Completed	Ginkgo Bioworks Holdings, Inc.DNA	listing ended	Delisted	0001193125-21-277420
Screaming Eagle Acquisition Corp.IPO 2022	Completed	Lionsgate Studios Corp.LION	+18.7%	Trading$11.87 · Aug 14, 2026	0001193125-24-137356

5 of 9 prior vehicles carry an honest post-close price, split-adjusted against the $10.00 trust baseline a holder gave up at the merger. Cash buyouts are read from the per-share consideration stated in the DEFM14A / SC 14D-9; a buyout no filing prices stays unpriced and stays out of the score. “Listing ended” means the quote stopped with no buyer — scored as a total loss because that is what the evidence says, but never printed as a percentage we cannot source.

Current fleet

the vehicles running today

Research profile

synthesized from SEC filings + sourced research

Harry E. Sloan, Jeff Sagansky and Eli Baker have run the same blank-check franchise since 2011 under a sequence of sponsor LLCs — Global Eagle Acquisition LLC, then Eagle Equity Partners LLC / II / IV / VI. Bold Eagle (BEAG) and Infinite Eagle (IEAG) are sponsored by Eagle Equity Partners IV, LLC and Eagle Equity Partners VI, LLC; six natural persons file Section 16 forms at BOTH — SLOAN HARRY (0001258248), SAGANSKY JEFFREY (0001207119), Baker Eli (0001615015), O'Connor Ryan, Park Jason and Watson Simon Richard. Sloan and Sagansky are the same CIKs that appear on the nine earlier vehicles below, which is what ties the pre-2020 "Eagle" vehicles to this house rather than a shared word.

Data provenance & audit trail2 internal entries

Written by SpacBrain’s data agents whenever a figure is captured, corrected or flagged, and kept verbatim so every number on this page can be traced back to the filing that states it. This is a running log, not the current record: an early entry may be superseded by a later correction — the panels above always hold the current values.

Eagle Equity Partners (Sloan/Sagansky) — sponsor record

NOTE-SEAL2026-08-15

Raw SEC identifiers lifted out of the public prose above (the sentences are unchanged); verbatim, each shown with the words it followed: "…e sponsored by Eagle Equity Partners IV, LLC (CIK 0002041465)" · "…002041465) and Eagle Equity Partners VI, LLC (CIK 0002098586)"

SPONSOR-FAMILY2026-08-14

Family asserted from primary SEC data only (Form 3/4 reporting-owner XML, EDGAR submissions formerNames, sponsor-LLC registered addresses, and the vehicles' own prospectuses).

The Sponsor Score is a deterministic research heuristic over primary-sourced rows — never a recommendation, and never a prediction. It cannot tell you whether this sponsor’s next deal will work; it tells you, precisely and with its own uncertainty attached, what the last ones did.